

When Mayors Lead Urban Schools:
Toward developing a framework to assess the effects
of mayoral takeover of urban districts

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of the nation's large, urban school districts have made significant changes to their school governance framework by shifting from elected to mayoral-appointed school boards. We refer to this policy reform as "mayoral takeover" of urban school districts. In 2002, the largest school district in the nation became a mayoral takeover district when New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg was given control over the NYC public schools. With the addition of New York to a list of cities that includes Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C., nearly 2,000,000 students now receive their education in a mayoral takeover school district. Mayoral takeover further gained prominence in 2002 when voters in Cleveland strongly supported the continuation of the mayoral appointed board.

Mayors in several districts have also pursued aggressive education reform policy.¹ Explaining his increased involvement in the schools, St. Louis Mayor Francis Slay commented, "It tears my heart to see neighborhoods laid to waste because parents have fled the city to educate their children ... If fighting for better education will somehow impact me politically, that's the price I am willing to pay. Doing nothing was not an option."² Pittsburgh's Mayor Tom Murphy has recently received a report from his appointed citywide commission, which recommended mayoral takeover the school district.³

¹ Mayor Slay has not officially taken over the schools, but the slate of four candidates he backed in 2003 elections all won, providing him with significantly more power to reform the schools. Taking advantage of that position, he has now hired an outside team of turn-around specialists, including former NYC Chancellor Rudy Crew.

² Quoted in: Wagman, J. (2003). "Power brokers play role in campaign for school reform," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, p. C4.

³ The full report, "Keeping the Promise: The Case for Reform in the Pittsburgh Public Schools," is available on-line at: <http://www.educationcommission.org/KeepingthePromise-Full.pdf>. For several commentaries on this report, see the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette's* special forum: "The Mayor's Commission on Public Education: Three perspectives,"

Although a growing number of mayors share Mayor Slay's sentiments that "doing nothing" about their city's schools is not an option, it is not yet clear that the answer is "doing something" in the form of taking over the school district by appointing a majority of the school board. Thus, in light of its emerging significance for the governance of urban education, we address the question: *What are the consequences when mayors lead urban districts?*

Because mayoral takeover is designed to bring about major restructuring in the way schools are managed and governed, we attempt to develop a comprehensive framework for more systematic assessment of this reform strategy. Integrating data from the Annual Survey of Government Finances and the National Center for Education's Common Core of Data, we examine the relationship between mayoral takeover and fiscal and staffing indicators. We also look at student achievement trends in districts that have implemented mayoral takeover for over four years.

We find that mayoral takeover seems to be increasingly related to federal revenue sources, and is associated with greater levels of per-pupil expenditures in core educational functions, such as instruction and student support. We do not find that mayoral takeover is strongly related to fiscal health or district debt levels. While we find some mixed evidence on recent student achievement, we find no evidence to suggest that mayoral takeover will leave the worst schools behind in the wake of reform.

The paper is organized into five sections. Following this introduction, Section II provides a brief background on the political dynamics of mayoral takeover. We review relevant literatures and develop a set of hypotheses about both positive and negative effects which may result from mayoral takeover. In Section III we discuss the data and analytic approach we use to test our

Sunday, September 28, 2003. See also: Lee, C. J. & Chute, E. (2003). "Mayors in the Schools: Will city join in trend to give more control over board members?" *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*. Sunday, April 27, 2003.

hypotheses. In Section IV we discuss the results of these analyses. We conclude the paper in Section V with an overall evaluation of what mayoral takeover has produced thus far, what we might be likely to see in the years to come, and what researchers can do to improve our state of knowledge of this governance strategy.

II. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Defining “mayoral takeover”

As used in this study, “mayoral takeover” refers to a policy reform in which the mayor is given the power to appoint the city’s school board members. This reform is designed to integrate electoral accountability and educational performance at the system-wide level (Wong 1999). As New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg argued for an appointed school board, “The public, through the mayor, must control the school system.”

There are varying degrees of “takeover.” As Kirst (2002) points out, mayors may have “low, low-moderate, moderate, or high influence.” In Oakland, for instance, Mayor Brown can appoint 3 board members, but this does not form a majority. In Washington, D.C. Mayor Williams currently appoints only 4 of the 9 members.⁴ In these “partial” or “hybrid” governance system, the mayor has greater (but not absolute) control over the board’s activities. In Baltimore, a city-state partnership complicates the politics of control (Orr 1999).

Mayoral appointed school boards have been established through one of the three legislative processes:

- 1.) State legislation that grant authority to the mayor to replace an elected board with an appointed board (such as Chicago)

⁴ As recently as a few weeks ago, Mayor Williams has pushed to gain full control of the schools, commenting that, “The schools ought to be under the mayor and the council. I’m ultimately accountable for what happens to the students.” *Washington Post*, “Williams Seeks School Takeover,” September 25, 2003; Page A01.

- 2.) State legislation that calls for a citywide referendum on whether to grant the mayor the authority to appoint the school board (such as Boston and Cleveland).
- 3.) Voter approval of changes in a charter that allow the mayor to appoint school board members (such as Oakland).

Takeover remains in national spotlight

Mayoral appointment of school board members gained national prominence in the mid- to late-1990s as a host of cities enacted the reform. In the first few years of the 21st century, mayoral takeover has not relinquished its place in the national spotlight. In an increasing number of urban districts, the mayor assumes control of schools with an appointed school board. Currently, twenty-four states have passed legislation authorizing the management of school districts by either mayors or state officials (Cibulka, 1999). Mayoral control has occurred in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, and Washington, D.C., among others. Because the No Child Left Behind Act identifies takeover as a corrective action to turn around failing districts, it is likely that we will see a growing number of cities where mayors will seek control over the school boards.

In this regard, mayoral leadership in education occurs in a policy context wherein years of decentralized reform alone have not produced system-wide improvement in student performance in big-city schools. Reform advocates who pushed for site-based autonomy may have overestimated the capacity of the school community to raise academic standards. Decentralized reforms are directed at reallocating power between the system-wide authority and the individual school sites. However, decentralized initiatives often fail to give full consideration to powerful demand makers in the system, such as the

teachers' union and other organized interests. Decisions made at the school site are constrained by collective bargaining agreements, federal and state mandates, and the labor market. In addition, decentralization may widen the gap between schools with access to external capital (such as parental organizational skills and grants from foundations) and those that receive limited support from these sources. In response to these concerns, integrated governance enables the mayor to rely on system-wide standards to hold schools and student accountable for their performance. Failing schools and students are subject to sanctions while being given additional support (Wong 2001).

Like many major educational reforms, mayoral appointment of school boards is likely to have both proponents and skeptics. On one hand, proponents argue that the mayor-led strategy has the potential to turn around low-performing schools. Takeover initiatives tend to hold schools and students accountable to system wide standards. To restore public trust, takeover reform maintains a strong focus on low-performing schools and students, including allocating additional resources to those schools. Takeover reform also recruits non-traditional leaders to top management positions in order to change existing organizational practices and culture. On the other hand, skeptics may see mayoral control as an infringement of professional autonomy at the site level. Mayoral appointed administrators may also lack expertise on instructional and curriculum issues. Too often, takeover reform pays primary attention to standardized test achievement as the most important measure of school improvement. There have also been questions raised about the role of race in the state legislative process that grants mayoral control. Mayors, known to mediate and seek compromise, may treat employment in the school district as their "spoils" to support partisan activities.

Theoretical Framework & Research Base

In previous studies (Wong 1999; Wong & Shen 2002), we have discussed the theory of mayoral takeover at greater length. The volume edited by Cuban and Usdan (2003) and a recent report by Kirst (2002) also provide useful introductions to the new mayoral takeover approach. Because we wish to focus on empirical evaluation in this study, we briefly recall several key theoretical points. Two of the guiding principles behind mayoral takeover are “integrated governance” and consolidation of power (Wong, 1999). In the integrated governance framework, electoral politics are integrated with school district performance. City residents can express their pleasure (displeasure) with the schools via the mayoral election. Additionally, takeover consolidates power in a single office. This is designed as a corrective to sprawling administrative systems with too much fragmentation. Mayoral takeover is based on several organizational principles that:

- Recognize that existing political structures are not easily alterable
- Empower the district level administration to intervene in failing schools
- Enable city hall to manage conflicting interests and reduce fragmentary rules, and
- Integrate electoral accountability and educational performance standards at the system wide level (Wong, 1999; Wong 1992).

There is a growing literature on the politics of mayoral takeover and changing urban school board dynamics. Orr (1999) provides a detailed look at the interplay of social capital and civic capital in Baltimore schools. Cuban and Usdan (eds., 2003) have compiled studies from Chicago, Boston, Seattle, San Diego, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Henig, Hula, Orr, & Pedescleaux (1999) include detailed case studies of black-led cities, including Atlanta, Detroit, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. A forthcoming volume edited by Henig and Rich have included contextually rich case studies of the politics of mayoral control. Some of this research

has also focused on takeover in which a state board of overseers (rather than the mayor) is given control of the school district.

Kirst (2002) has presented some of the most focused analysis of mayoral takeover, and in synthesizing several relevant studies, he finds that:

“It is not possible to link many changes in school policy and practice to changes in governance. Some major trends can be attributed in part to mayoral intervention, although there is no apparent relationship between level (low, moderate, or high) of mayoral influence and the impact on schools.”⁵

The difficulty of linking mayoral takeover (or other changes in governance structure) to improvements in student achievement is a finding consistent with other researchers. Several cross-district takeover studies seem consistent in finding that it has been effective in stabilizing district-level finances and management practices, but has had more trouble in improving student achievement (Ziebarth 2002). In a study for the Reason Public Policy Institute, Seder (2000) examines a sample of takeovers and finds that “from a financial-management standpoint, most of the different intervention strategies tend to be successful ... however, these intervention strategies have not consistently turned around academic results.” Bushweller (1998) emphasized that successful districts should “align the local curriculum with state standards and tests.” This study also suggested that low administrative turnover and open communication with the community are keys to improvement.

The empirical research base on the effectiveness of mayoral takeover leaves many lingering questions. We have begun to address these questions in other studies (Wong & Shen 2002, 2003). In the present paper, we build on previous work by developing an assessment framework to better integrate our understanding of the many, often inter-related results that follow from mayors taking of the schools. We classify these effects broadly into four areas:

⁵ Kirst (2002), p. 8.

1. Productivity, e.g. student achievement
2. Governance, e.g. school board leadership
3. Human capital, e.g. characteristics of teachers & leadership
4. Management, e.g. financial & organization operations

We readily acknowledge that these are broadly defined categories. In the context of improving urban schools, however, research has emphasized the need to widen our scope and examine city- and civic-wide conditions. Hill, Campbell, & Harvey (2000) remind us that *It Takes a City*. Portz, Stein, & Jones (1999) show us how “civic capacity” can determine success or failure in school reform efforts.

The challenge we take on in this paper is to systematically assess a broad set of potential consequences from mayoral takeover. Our specific questions can be organized within the framework just presented:

Productivity

- *Achievement*: Has student achievement in mayoral takeover districts improved? Are these gains consistent over time? Are some schools being “left behind”?

Governance

- *School Board & School District Leadership*: How does mayoral takeover work to consolidate power? What unique concerns might it raise for school board governance?

Human capital

- *Instruction vs. Central Office Expenditures*: Will mayoral takeover result in increased spending on central office, supervisory, or administrative services? Will expenditures on instruction be reduced with a larger central office?

- *Staffing Allocations:* Does a new management structure under mayoral takeover produce unique staffing allocations? Are greater percentages of employees assigned to the central office?

Management

- *Revenues:* Will mayoral takeover result in an increased in-flow of resources? Will these resources be earmarked for certain sub-categories? Will these resources come from different sources?
- *Capital Outlay & Debt:* Will mayoral takeover introduce additional expenditures for capacity building via capital outlays? Will mayoral takeover finance programs through increased debt? Alternatively, will mayoral takeover be able to reduce debt levels?
- *Fiscal Health:* Is mayoral takeover associated with stronger fiscal health in school districts?

III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Sample Selection & Data Sources

Theoretically, there are two ways to assess the effects of mayoral takeover. First, we can use a cross-sectional framework and ask, “What is different about mayoral takeover school districts, as compared to similar districts that have not elected to enact takeover reform?”

Second, we can use a longitudinal framework and ask, “In the cities that have enacted mayoral takeover, how are things different now as compared to before the reform’s introduction?”

The first decision to make for the cross-sectional analysis is what sub-set of school districts to include in our sample. This is an important step in the context of mayoral takeover, because it is not a policy reform designed for all school districts. Specifically, mayoral appointed boards have gained prominence as policy options in large, urban districts. Our takeover cities are dispersed throughout the hundred largest districts in the nation.⁶ To determine a set of peer districts, we make use of two classifications made by the National Center for Education Statistics. First, we focus on school districts that are designated as serving “primarily the center city of a Metropolitan Statistical Area.”⁷ Second, we look at large cities. Thus, we restrict our analysis to the 100 largest school districts serving central cities. In the analysis to follow, we present summary statistics for both of these sub-sets.⁸

This purposeful sample approach is useful because it helps us control for the unique challenges that are faced when educating students in large, urban context. Since we want to isolate the effects of a specific education governance structure, we must attempt to disentangle

⁶ The national ranks for the districts are (in descending order): Chicago (4th), Detroit (12th), Baltimore City (23rd), Cleveland (41st), Washington, D.C. (48th), Boston (53rd), and Oakland (80th). Although not in our Takeover sub-set for the years 1992-2001, newcomer New York City ranks 1st.

⁷ This classification is reported in the Common Core of Data (NCES, various years).

⁸ Responding to a helpful peer comment, we also include a summary line for the 100 largest non-urban districts. These are the 100 largest districts that (as coded by the NCES), “serve a metropolitan statistical area, but not primarily its central city.” We do not discuss these results at length in this paper, but provide the results in the tables for readers who are curious about those comparisons.

the specific effects of mayoral takeover from the more general effects of simply being a big city school district.⁹ To illustrate briefly and foreshadow one of our findings, we find that mayoral takeover cities receive a greater percentage of their revenues from federal sources. A critic might argue that the relationship we've found is not related to mayoral takeover, but to something other factor that's tied to big urban districts. If we had a sample that included many small and non-urban districts, this criticism would be quite well taken. But because we *only include* large urban districts in our sample, all of our observations share a similar background. But because we only include large urban districts in our sample, we can control for size and poverty levels in our regressions and isolate the takeover effect.

Once the sample has been selected, the next step is finding data that can be compared across school districts. To meet this data requirement, we utilize data from two federally administered data collection programs. The bulk of the data used for cross-sectional analysis comes from the Annual Survey of Government Finances conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census.¹⁰ The Annual Survey gathers data on revenues, expenditures, and debt from over 15,000 school districts. In addition to this financial data, we use the National Center for Education Statistics' Common Core of Data (CCD).¹¹ We used the CCD data as a source for our demographic control variables, as well as data on district staffing patterns.

In addition to providing data for the cross-sectional analysis, the financial and CCD data is also used longitudinally. The timing of the first mayoral takeover (Boston in 1992) coincides well with the starting points for the two national data sets. Using data from 1992 to the most

⁹ Assuming we could isolate the effects of mayoral takeover, we still need to pursue the follow-up question: "What is it about takeover that generates these effects?" We pick up this question in our concluding discussion in Section V.

¹⁰ All of this financial data was downloaded for analysis from the Census Bureau's web site at: <http://www.census.gov/govs/www/school.html>.

¹¹ All of this CCD data was downloaded for analysis from the NCES' web site at: <http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/ccddata.asp>.

recent year (2001), we are able to look at changes over a ten year time span. We track these differences in both individual takeover cities and relevant groups such as the 100 largest urban districts.

To adjust for geographic cost differentials, we use the geographic cost of education index (GCEI) developed by Chambers (1998). This index appears to be the most applicable adjustment measure currently available (Fowler 2001). The index is currently only available for three years: 1987, 1990, and 1993. On one hand, this presents a problem since our financial data is from later years. On the other hand, however, if the relative costs between geographies remain relatively constant over time we should not seriously bias our findings by incorporating this index. Luckily for our analysis, one of the conclusions from Chamber's (1998) analysis is that "the patterns of geographic variations in cost do not change substantially over time and that the GECI estimated for any given year provides a reasonable estimate of the GECI for adjacent years" (p. x). Given this consistency across years, we do not believe that adjusting our figures with the 1993 index will seriously jeopardize the validity of our results. Put another way, by relying on this index we work under the assumption that cities that were more expensive in 1993 remained, by and large, just as expensive in the late 1990s.

The other data we use for longitudinal evaluation is achievement data from individual school districts. Because districts employ a host of different student evaluation tools (e.g. different state tests or locally developed assessments), at this point we do not have a credible way of comparing achievement cross-sectionally.¹² Because we lose the ability to compare takeover districts to others in the sample, we are forced to look at achievement trends in

¹² Because the takeover reform is relatively new, employing ACT or SAT scores does not seem theoretically appropriate. Given that these high school ACT/SAT test takers would have spent most of their time in a district that was *not* under mayoral takeover, their test results (e.g. in 2000 or 2001) would likely not be an accurate indication of the mayoral takeover initiative.

individual takeover locations. This approach is admittedly less desirable than our framework for evaluating finances and management effects. It remains, however, an important diagnostic tool for tracking progress in mayoral takeover districts. Achievement trends are also the set of numbers that is likely to draw the most attention from parents and city residents. To add an additional angle on achievement, we look at performance in the lowest performing schools in the four prominent examples of mayoral takeover: Boston, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland. We also consider the variance of school achievement in these four districts.

Finally, to gain some leverage on the question of participation in school governance, we examine election data from Chicago's Local School Councils (LSC). Each school has a council composed of 6 parents, 2 teachers, 2 community members, and a student. We have data (from 1989-2002) on the number of candidates running for these seats, and we also have (from 1989-1998) data on voter turnout for these elections. We look at trends over time to evaluate the potential impact of mayoral takeover, and we also use school-level data from 2000 to see what types of schools are associated with the highest levels of local leadership.

Construction of Indicators

Measures of urban school governance

In an attempt to control for other aspects of urban school governance that may determine changes in finances, management, and achievement, we constructed six additional governance measures. These measures were created by the authors, using information available on school district web sites and through follow-up interviews. Focusing on the 100 largest urban school districts, we developed these six variables:

- **Average tenure of the school board** (calculated by averaging across the tenures of all school board members)

- **Tenure of the mayor** (number of years the mayor has been in office)
- **Average tenure of district superintendent** (number of years the super has been in charge of district operations)
- **Percentage of school board members elected at-large**
- **Number of school board seats**
- **Whether or not the superintendent's job title is "CEO"**

These measures were constructed in 2003, and therefore there is some slippage in using them with the rest of data set (which reaches only to 2001). To the extent that there have been significant changes over the past few years, these six variables will be more or less accurate measures.

Financial: Revenues, Expenditures, & Debt

In analyzing the financial data, we construct two general type of variables from the raw Annual Survey of Government data. The first type is a measure of *allocation*, examining financial sub-categories a a percentage of the whole. The second type is a measure of *magnitude*, exploring the amount (dollars per student) being spent in various sub-categories. All of our allocation measures are reported as percentages, and all of our magnitude measures take into count enrollment and are therefore reported as \$dollars per student. For each of the revenue and expenditure measures, we consider both allocation and magnitude.

On the **revenue** side, we considered a large number of sub-categories, but focused our analysis on the three *sources* of revenue:¹³

¹³ In preliminary rounds of analysis, we looked at levels and changes in the entire set of sub-categories listed in the Annual Survey of Governments. These sub-categories, grouped in Federal, State, and Local groups, are as follows. *Federal*: Title I grants, children with disabilities - IDEA, child nutrition act, Eisenhower math and science, drug-free schools, Title VI grants, vocational and technical education, all other federal aid through state, federal revenue nonspecified, impact aid (P.L. 815 and 874), bilingual education, and all other direct federal aid. *State*: general formula assistance, special education programs, transportation programs, staff improvement programs, compensatory and basic skills programs, vocational education programs, capital outlay and debt service programs,

- Percentage of revenue from **federal** sources
- Percentage of revenue from **state** sources
- Percentage of revenue from **local** sources

On the **expenditure** side, we look at expenditures on:¹⁴

- **Instruction** (total current spending for instruction)
- **Capital Outlay** (all expenditures on capital outlay)
- **Support Services** (total current spending for support services)
- **Central Office Services** (spending on central administration services, a sub-category of Support Services)
- **General Administration Services** (spending on general administration services, a sub-category of Support Services)
- **School Administration Services** (spending on school administration services, a sub-category of Support Services)
- **Wages for Central Administration** (focus only on wages for central administration, included in Support Services)
- **Wages for General Administration** (focus only on wages for general administration, included in Support Services)
- **Wages for School Administration** (focus only on wages for school administration, included in Support Services)

bilingual education programs, gifted and talented programs, school lunch programs, all other revenues from state sources, state payments for LEA employee benefits, other state payments (books, buses, etc), and state revenue nonspecified. *Local*: property taxes, general sales or gross receipts taxes, public utility taxes, individual and corporate income taxes, all other taxes, parent government contributions, revenue from cities and counties, revenue from other school systems, tuition fees from pupils and parents, transport. fees from pupils and parents, school lunch revenues, textbook sales and rentals, student activity receipts, other sales and service revenues, student fees nonspecified, interest earnings, and miscellaneous other local revenues.

¹⁴ We also considered other categories such as food service, student transportation, employee benefits, and adult education to see if there were budget cuts made to these areas as cost cutting moves. We did not find evidence of such maneuvers.

- **Wages for Teachers** (focus only on wages for teachers, included in Instruction)

We also consider several measures of **debt** (measured as dollars per student):

- Long debt issued during the school year
- Long debt retired during the school year
- Long debt outstanding at the end of the school year
- Short debt outstanding at the end of the school year
- Cash funds on hand at the end of the school year

Finally, we draw the revenue and expenditure sides together to look at **overall fiscal health** of the school district. We compute fiscal health as “total revenues – total expenditures” / divided by total expenditures.

We make adjustments for inflation in order to make all dollar figures constant in \$2001. To make these adjustments, we use the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Constant Dollar Employment Cost Index.¹⁵ Because the majority of school district expenditures are used on salaries and wages, we use the index for State & Local Governments’ Educational Services. Because the majority of our analysis is either cross-sectional or involves changes in allocation (i.e. percentages and not raw dollar figures) over time, we do not believe our analysis is particularly sensitive to our choice of inflation adjustors.¹⁶ What might be more damaging to our analysis is our lack of adjustments for *regional* cost differences. As scholars have pointed out, not accounting for differences across regions may be a serious problem in the analysis of school finance (e.g. Fowler & Monk 2001).

Management: Staffing Allocations

¹⁵ More information about this index is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics at their website, <http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/>.

¹⁶ We recognize, however, it will be useful to check this assumption by trying alternative inflation adjustment methodologies.

Our measures of management are staffing measures derived from the Common Core of Data (CCD). We examine the percentage of employees in various district positions. The CCD reports, for each district, the number of full-time equivalent employees in a number of positions: teachers, aides, instructional coordinators and supervisors, guidance counselors, librarians/media support staff, LEA administration, and school administration.¹⁷ Based on these figures, we construct a series of measures that can each be read as “**Percentage of all school district employees who are ...**

- **Teachers** (all pre-k, kg, elementary, and secondary teachers)
- **Aides** (all instructional aides)
- **Administration** (LEA administrators + LEA administrative support staff)
- **Supervisors** (all instructional coordinators & supervisors)
- **Student Support** (all student support services staff)
- **Guidance** (all elementary and secondary guidance counselors)

In addition, we look at the distribution of teachers across grade levels, producing a series of 3 measures that can each be read as, “Percentage of all teachers who are ...

- **KG or Pre-K teachers**
- **Elementary school teachers**
- **High school teachers**

¹⁷ The data are actually presented in even smaller categories. The full set of 17 categories are: Pre-K teachers, KG teachers, elementary teachers, secondary teachers, instructional aides, instructional coordinators & supervisors, elementary guidance counselors, secondary guidance counselors, librarians/media specialists, library/media support staff, LEA administrators, LEA administrative support staff, school administrators, school administrative support staff, student support services staff, and all other support services staff.

Achievement: District Standardized Tests

To measure achievement, we turn to the standardized tests used by individual takeover districts.¹⁸ All data was gathered from relevant school district or state department web sites. In Chicago, we analyze achievement on the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS) and the Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP). The ITBS is a nationally recognized assessment tool, while the TAP is a test developed by the Chicago Public Schools. In Boston, we look at performance on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). In Cleveland we analyze achievement on the Ohio Proficiency Test (OPT), and in Detroit on the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP). In Baltimore, results are from the Maryland School Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP). Although they are not included in our takeover sub-set, we also present recent achievement data from Philadelphia and New York. In Philadelphia, the data is from the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA). In New York, data is from the NYC Citywide English Language Arts (ELA) test, New York State English Language Arts (ELA) Test; NYC Math Test (NYC-M), and New York State Math Test.

For our school-level analysis, we examine performance at particular grade levels. In Boston, we look at grades 4, 8, and 10. In Chicago, we examine grades 4, 8, and the average of grades 9 & 11. In Detroit, we consider grades 4 and 7. In Cleveland, we look at grades 4, 6, and 10.

Analytical Approach

For all of our cross-sectional analysis where we compare takeover districts with other similar districts, we use two complementary approaches. We first present summary statistics that track our indicators across districts and over time. These summary tables (marked as Table S-#)

¹⁸ In each case, we consider the %Proficient or its equivalent. We note the measure for each district in Tables A-1 and A-2.

allow for two types of comparison. Read vertically, they allow for comparison of takeover districts to other large urban districts. They also present individual indicators for each takeover district. It should be noted that the “Takeover” sub-group listed in first line of these summary tables refers to averages (unweighted) across 7 districts: Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Baltimore, Detroit, Washington, D.C., and Oakland. In earlier years on the table, not all of these cities had turned to mayoral appointed school boards. Thus, the most important years for cross-sectional comparison are the later (especially post-1998) years. If the tables are read horizontally, they provide a look at changes over the ten year time span from 1992 to 2001. Over time, we feel the most interesting changes to note are those that happen in individual takeover cities when they transition from pre- to post-takeover. We emphasize the years of these changes with a heavy dividing bar in the table. We use the data presented in these summary tables to initiate discussion of our indicators and trends.

To test the strength of these apparent relationships, however, we move beyond summary statistics and employ multi-variate analysis. Although somewhat limited in our choice of covariates, we settle on two demographic controls: student enrollment (as a measure of district size) and the percent of student eligible for free/reduced price lunch (as a measure of poverty levels in the district). We use these two traditional controls because they are causally prior to the implementation of takeover, and because each is likely to have an independent effect on expenditures, revenues, debt, and staffing decisions.¹⁹

¹⁹ We also considered using another traditional control – the percentage of minority students in the district. There are strong correlations, however, between takeover and the percentage of African-Americans. Looking at the 50 largest urban school districts, the Pearson correlation coefficient is .486 and significant at the .001 level (for takeover & % Afr.-Amer.). While there is also a (less) powerful correlation between free-lunch and takeover, we opt to use free lunch. This avoids the more serious correlation problem between % Afr.-American and takeover. It also seems more consistent with the logic of government funding decisions, which are generally based initially on income levels (even if those income levels are highly correlated with the percentage of minority students in the district).

In addition to enrollment and free-lunch measures, we also run a series of models that include our set of additional aspects of school district governance. These are included to test the hypothesis that the effects we are seeing are not due to takeover *per se*, but to modifications takeover brings about in other aspects of the politics of urban education.

Integrating these demographic and governance variables into the same equation, we run OLS regressions of the general form for each year t :

$$INDICATOR_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TAKEOVER_t + \beta_2 ENROLLMENT_t + \beta_3 FREE_LUNCH_t + \beta_4 GOVERNANCE_t + e_t$$

where $INDICATOR_t$ is one of our financial or management indicators for year t , $TAKEOVER_t$ is a dichotomous (1,0) variable indicating whether or not a school district has implemented mayoral takeover, $ENROLLMENT_t$ is the number of pupils counted in the Fall of Fiscal Year t , $FREE_LUNCH_t$ is the percentage of students in the district eligible for free/reduced price lunch in year t , and $GOVERNANCE_t$ is one of six measures of urban school governance.

As mentioned when introducing this section, we are not able to perform the same sort of cross-district regression analysis in relation to student achievement. Instead, we provide summaries of recent district-level trends in the takeover districts. We also examine the progress of the lowest-performing schools, using the achievement data described earlier. Recognizing that year-to-year fluctuations in test scores may be the result of measurement error (Kane, Staiger, & Geppert 2002), we look at several periods of change. We compare the progress of the district as a whole vs. the progress of the schools that started out at the bottom. Here we are interested in seeing if these schools at the bottom were “left behind,” or if they were able to keep pace with the rest of district. We also consider the variance of achievement within the district. We want to

consider the spread of high- vs. low-performing schools. To measure this variance, we look at the Coefficient of Variation (CV). The coefficient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean, and is a common measure of variance. When calculating the CV, we weight school observations by their enrollment.

IV. RESULTS

In this section, we present a number of results. To help connect the tables to the text, we label all Summary statistics tables, **S-**. We label all tables that are presenting Regression results, **R-**. The summary and regression tables present our management and financial results. We label all tables presenting Achievement analysis, **A-**. The tables related to Chicago's Local School Council elections are labeled, **L-**. In the interest of space, we have included only the most relevant sections of our tables.²⁰

Takeover and Additional Governance Measures: Boards with appointed members have shorter average tenures than boards with only elected members

As a preliminary step in analyzing the effect of mayoral takeover, we look to see how it is related to other aspects of urban school politics. Specifically, we consider it in relation to our six measures: average tenure of the school board, tenure of the superintendent, tenure of the mayor, the percentage of school board seats elected at-large, the number of school board seats, and whether or not the superintendent's job title is that of CEO. To test the relationship between these measures and takeover we run a simple OLS regression (**Table R-1**).

Our regression results suggest only one relationship is of statistical significance – the inverse relationship between mayoral takeover and the average number of years of service for

²⁰ Additional tables, which provide summary details district-by-district and results from alternative regression models (including alternative governance indicators as control variables), are available from the authors upon request.

school board members. This result seems a logical by-product of school boards that have appointed members. First, mayoral and state appointed board members are a relatively new phenomenon, and therefore these appointed board members may not have had as long an opportunity to serve. Equally important, however, is the mechanism by which mayors can remove board members who are seen as hindering district achievement growth. Finally, appointed board members may not have the same electoral incentives to retain their posts for additional terms.

Revenue: Takeover Associated with Greater Percentage of Revenue from Feds

Although takeover districts follow roughly the same revenue distribution pattern (between federal, state, and local sources) as other large urban districts, the summary table (**Table S-2**) suggests that they may receive a greater percentage of federal revenue and less state revenue than do others. Federal funding, however, may likely be driven by the presence of large at-risk populations. To control for this possibility and check the strength of the relationship, we perform a simple OLS regression. Reporting the results in **Table R-2**, we see some evidence that supports the relationship between takeover status and the percentage of revenues coming from federal sources. Even when controlling for poverty and size, in all 4 years (1998-2001), the relationship is positive. In 2000 and 2001, it is statistically significant.

The direct relationship between takeover and federal revenue may be indicative of a *politics of grantsmanship*. Although we do not have access to the nature of the relationships between mayors and federal officials, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that many of the takeover mayors have prominent national positions. Both Mayor Daley of Chicago and Mayor Menino of Boston have been leaders in the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Former Mayor Archer of

Detroit served as President of the National League of Cities. Mayor Brown of Oakland brings a national reputation to his office. From a broader perspective, the literature on intergovernmental relations suggests that mayors are keen on using their lobbying capacity to negotiate for federal grants in various policy domains, such as community development and housing. Mayoral appointed school board seems more likely to be a part of the city's overall effort to secure intergovernmental transfers.

Expenditures Larger in Mayoral Takeover Cities

When looking at how mayoral takeover districts allocate their funds, we find only one significant difference. We find a positive relationship between mayoral takeover and the percent of total expenditures on General Administration services (**Table R-3**). When we look at the trend lines (**Table S-3**), we see that while other districts in the Top 100 urban districts began to reduce their spending in the general administration category, the takeover districts maintained their level and even increased in some instances. Even within the takeover group, however, there are variations. Boston, for instance, has maintained percentages below the average.

We find the strongest relationship is between mayoral takeover and the *magnitude* of expenditures in a number of categories. After controlling for size and poverty levels, we find that mayoral takeover is positively associated with per-pupil expenditures in instruction (**Tables R-4, S-4**) and teachers' wages (**Tables R-5, S-5**).

What is important to note, however, is that these relationships exist even before the districts turn to takeover reform. Even before the mayor takes charge, these seven districts made larger per-pupil expenditures than others in their peer group. One plausible explanation is that mayoral takeover districts are systems that were especially well positioned to take advantage of the economic prosperity of the 1990s. Additionally, these districts are likely to have experienced

a succession of educational reform initiatives that led to mayoral takeover. The continued strong level of expenditures once mayors gain control could be indicative of mayors' choices to keep high levels of allocations in public education when they are in charge. This would be consistent with the building up of capacity with their "political will."

What we don't find

Although null results do not generally draw as much attention as coefficients with "****" next to them, they can still be quite important.²¹ In the context of mayoral takeover, we report a series of null findings, some of which will ease some concerns about how mayors might influence the use of school district funds; others of which will give pause to those who see great promise in mayoral leadership. Specifically, in our multivariate analysis, we find the following:

- We do not find evidence of significant, consistent relationships between mayoral takeover and fiscal health.
- Mayoral takeover does not appear to be related to any of our five measures of debt.²²
- Mayoral takeover is also not related to capital outlay expenditures.²³
- Takeover does not seem to be related to most of the allocation indicators. There are no significant relationship between takeover and the percentage of all expenditures on instruction, capital outlay, student services, or central office.
- Finally, we find that mayoral takeover is not related to the percentage of wages allocated to teachers, school administration wages, or central administration.

²¹ While important, we know of no way to efficiently show null findings (without dragging another large table into the paper). To keep the number of tables down, we simply report the null findings. We are happy to provide the results upon request.

²² There is some slight evidence of an inverse relationship between takeover and cash on hand at the end of the school year, but this finding was not consistent across most models and years.

²³ The only significant relationships are seen in 1998, but this is before the majority of our takeover districts had implemented the reform.

Staffing: Takeover Linked to More Staff for Student Support Services

The only staffing relationship that held up under multivariate regression was the distribution of staff to student support services (**Table R-6**).²⁴ NCES defines Student Support Services as those staff who “nurture, but do not instruct” students.²⁵ When we look at district-by-district figures, however, it seems that Detroit is operating as an outlier with a significantly higher percentage of its staff allocated to support (**Table S-6**). Detroit’s jump, however, comes precisely during the years of its transition from an elected to an appointed board. In Chicago and Washington, D.C. we also see evidence of jumps after implementing takeover.

This shift in staffing allocation may suggest a broader reform strategy. From the mayor's office, which takes into consideration the interest of the city as a whole, failing schools are constrained by broad community and institutional context, such as gangs, crimes, health, etc. In order to turn around failing schools, mayoral appointed school boards are likely to allocate more supportive staff to combat social problems in the immediate school environment. For example, mayoral appointed school boards have instituted vision tests in inner city schools when they found that many elementary students failed the tests in part because they could not follow the materials presented in the blackboard.

Achievement

When we look at overall achievement trends across takeover districts, there is some evidence for cautious optimism (**Tables A-1, A-2**). To be sure, districts differ in their

²⁴ We explored a number of other potential relationships, but did not find significant relationships. For space reasons, we elect not to present the summary tables on these variables that were not significantly related in the multivariate regression.

²⁵ In their Documentation of Common Core Data, NCES notes that this category includes “attendance officers; staff providing health, psychology, speech pathology, audiology, or social services; and supervisors of the preceding staff and of health, transportation, and food service workers.”

performance. While some districts continue to improve scores, others have leveled off or even fallen in some subjects. Among the key findings are:

- In three of the five districts, elementary schools are improving their standardized test scores in both reading and mathematics. Baltimore and Detroit (more recent cases of takeover) showed mixed results in student performance.
- In Boston the percent of students who met proficiency in the MCAS rose in both 4th and 8th grades for both reading and mathematics. For example in reading, 4th graders who met proficiency increased from 5% to 29% between 1998 and 2002. In mathematics, 8th graders who were proficient increased from 17% to 25% between 1998 and 2001.
- In Chicago, the percent of K-8 students at or above national norms on the reading ITBS increased from 37% to 43% during 1998 and 2002. In mathematics, the improvement was from 39% to 47%.
- In Cleveland, reading proficiency for all 4th graders improved from 23% to 40% and for all 6th graders from 17% to 21% during 1998 and 2002. In mathematics, improvement was even greater: 22 to 44% in 4th grade and 12% to 24% in 6th grade.
- In Baltimore, reading performance at the 3rd grade declined but 8th graders showed an improvement from 7% to 11% in terms of satisfying the state standards. In mathematics, 3rd graders improved from 13% to 20%, while 8th graders slightly improved from 13% to 14% in meeting the Maryland performance standards.
- Only in Detroit did the mayoral appointed system trend down, though with some fluctuations, in student performance in reading and mathematics.

We further see that the upward achievement trends in the elementary grades seem to be matched by gains at the high school level as well:

- In Boston, the percent of 10th graders who were proficient in the MCAS increased in both reading and mathematics. In reading, 10th graders improved their MCAS performance from 23% to 41% between 1998 and 2002. In mathematics, the improvement was from 14% to 30%.
- In Chicago, TAP reading performance for 9th and 10th graders improved from 29% to 34% during 1998 and 2002.
- In Cleveland, reading proficiency at the 10th grade improved from 76% to 85%, while mathematics proficiency rose from 41% to 50% at the 10th grade.

When we shift our attention to the lowest performing schools, we do *not* find evidence to suggest that the lowest performing schools are being “left behind.” We find, in fact, that gains in achievement are especially significant for the lowest performing schools (**Tables A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6**). Part of these gains for the bottom schools may be due to regression to the mean, i.e. they’re already so far down, they’re likely to go back up. But at the very least, these findings should allay fears that the worst-performing schools will simply be ignored in mayoral takeover regimes. We find that:

- Compared to all schools in Boston, the lowest performing schools reduced the number of failing students at a faster rate than the district as a whole in both reading and mathematics in elementary and high school grades. For example, between 2000 and 2002, while 8% fewer 4th graders failed in reading district wide, 20% fewer 4th graders in the lowest performing schools failed in reading.
- Over time, gains in student performance in Boston seemed to grow in some of the grades. For example, while an additional 5% of the 8th graders in the lowest performing schools achieved proficiency in reading between 1998-99, 18% more 8th graders in those schools achieved reading proficiency between 2000-01 (since 8th grade reading test was not administered in 2002).
- In Chicago, the bottom 20% of elementary schools made greater improvements in all grades in both time intervals. Looking, for example, at fourth grade performance during 1997 and 1999, Chicago’s bottom 20% of schools bettered the average for all schools by 5% in Reading (16% for bottom 20% vs. 11% for all schools) and by 6% in Math (19% for bottom 20% vs. 13% for all schools).
- Throughout the 10th grade in Boston, the percent of students proficient in English fell 1% from 97-98 to 98-99. The drop seemed larger in the bottom 20% schools in the district (2%). At the same time, mathematics proficiency improved for the 10th grade by 2% overall and by 1% for the lowest performing schools. In other words, the bottom 20% high schools did not show as much improvement as the city wide average.
- Unlike Boston, Chicago’s lowest performing high schools showed a more rapid pace of improvement, when compared with the district wide average. From 1996-97 to 1998-97, for example, the average for all 9th and 10th grades went up 7% in math and 5% in English; the average for the bottom 20% of schools rose 9% in math and 6% in English.
- Detroit’s lowest performing schools seem to be doing better than the district as a whole. As the district seems to stall, or even make a turn for the worse, the lowest performing schools seem to be a little better off. From 2000 to 2002, the overall average of 4th

graders at the satisfactory level in math fell nearly 12%. The lowest performing schools, however, were able to raise their percent satisfactory nearly 10%.

- In Cleveland, the lowest performing schools track Cleveland's progress, and (as in Chicago and Boston) seem to make even larger gains in some grades. In grade 4 reading, for instance, the overall district performance was a gain of 6% in the percentage of students proficient or above. The bottom 20% of schools gained 11% over the same period.
- When we look at variance within the district, with the exception of Detroit, we do not see a trend of greater dispersal of achievement across schools. The gap between schools, in fact, seems to be decreasing in Chicago and Boston, and in some instances in Cleveland as well. This may suggest that the bottom (the outliers) are being pulled back toward the middle, as takeover regimes look to make gains by focusing their efforts on the least performing schools.

Participation in School Governance

One of the frequent concerns voiced about mayoral takeover is a weakening of public participation in the governance process. While much of this remains anecdotal, one piece of evidence we can turn to is participation in Chicago's Local School Council elections. Fung (1999) and *Designs for Change* (2002) have both examined the LSCs. *Designs for Change* (2002) summarizes a host of additional research on the LSCs, and raises concerns about central office interference in LSC activities. Fung conducts analysis of data similar to the data we analyze in this paper. Looking the 1996 elections, Fung finds that the number of candidates per open seat is inversely related to measure of low income, mobility, and minority population in the school. Parent turnout rates, however, are inversely related to the percentage of low income students in the school and the mobility of the student population. Parent turnout rates are positively associated with the percentage of African-American and Hispanic students in the school.

Looking at the trend as it continues through 2002, it appears that there has not been a substantial drop off in recent years in the number of candidates (teacher, parent, or community)

running per open seat (**Table L-1**). If we look at turnout for these elections, we see that there appears to be a slight drop off in community participation (**Table L-2**). Less of the non-teacher, non-parent community is involved in electing LSC members. If community members increasingly feel that their mayoral vote is also a vote on school governance, it might make sense that they feel less of a need to cast a LSC vote as well.

Updating Fung's analysis, we look at school level data from the 2000 elections. We examine the relationship between the number of candidates per open seat and several school demographic variables: low-income, student mobility, and percentage of African-American students. We find that parent participation rates in LSCs are lower in schools that are poorer, have greater student mobility, and have larger African-American student populations (**Table L-3**). At the same time, however, larger African-American student populations are *positively* related to community participation and unrelated to parent or teacher participation. The level of student mobility is positively related to both community and teacher participation levels. Given the challenge of student mobility, teachers and community members may see the need to engage more actively.

V. CONCLUSION

Summary

In this paper, we have updated our previous study of the effects of mayoral takeover. Now, as then, we must point out that there is an evidence gap in fully addressing the question of reform effects. With that caveat out of the way, however, the analysis using our updated and expanded takeover database suggests to us that there *are* several important conclusions to draw.

- **Mayoral takeover seems to be increasingly related to federal revenue sources.** The higher level of federal revenues in takeover districts suggests a “politics of grantsmanship” consistent with many other studies of mayoral leadership, dating all the way back to Robert Dahl’s *Who Governs?* analysis in which Mayor Lee is able to use his masterful political influence to obtain federal urban renewal funds to revitalize downtown in New Haven. In *City Choices*, Wong (1990) also talks about Mayor Donald Schaefer’s leadership in using a combination of federal and state resources to revitalize Inner Harbor as part of his Renaissance in Baltimore. Additional works by Lana Stein, Ester Fuchs, and Michael Rich also address this issue. Grantsmanship politics implies that mayors are keen on building up an organizational capacity, such as more intensive and targeted lobbying, to secure intergovernmental funds for schools. Related to this point is that grantsmanship would not impose fiscal burden on the local tax base. Managing federal and state cutbacks seem less politically risky than asking for an increase in local property taxes.

- **Mayoral takeover is associated with greater levels of per-pupil expenditures in important categories such as instruction and student support. At the same time, we do not find that there are greater allocations to central office operations.** This second finding on the absence of effects on central office operations suggests that the mayors of the 1990s are practicing “management efficiency,” whereby mayors are more accountable to “consumer citizens” and less bounded by existing organizational structures, such as unions and political parties (see Wong, Jain, & Clark, 1997). Similarly, mayoral control aims at moving resources closer to the core services, such as low performing schools and increased spending in support services.
- **It does not appear that mayoral takeover is strongly related to fiscal health or debt levels.** On one hand, these null findings might call into question the argument that mayor-led districts perform better financially. On the other hand, it is not the case that takeover districts finance their district’s new programs by amassing new debt.
- **Finally, we find no evidence to suggest that mayoral takeover will leave the worst schools behind in the wake of reform.** There is some evidence to suggest, in fact, that the lowest performing schools may receive even more attention, achieving gains even greater than district averages. Targeting resources to the lowest performing schools suggests that mayors take their newly gained responsibility seriously and consider the school district takeover as a longer term commitment. They want to address the toughest academic challenges early on in their governance of schools.

Future research directions

There remains much work for political scientists on the mayoral takeover front. As more and more mayors turn to this policy reform as a tool for school improvement, it is our hope that more political scientists will also begin to investigate the effects of mayoral appointed boards. Specifically, we feel there are improvements to be made on 1. the dependent variable (student achievement), and; 2. the explanatory variable of interest (nature of the governance structure).

- 1. Develop cross-district achievement measures.** The most important task for researchers is to establish credible methods for determining the relationship between mayoral takeover and achievement. While one method is to continue to track district performance (as we have done in this study), we would like to see takeover included as an independent variable to explain achievement levels across different districts.
- 2. Determine additional political measures of takeover.** In the present study, we have operationalized takeover in our analysis as a (1,0) dichotomous variable. While this is a useful first step, it is not consistent with actual mayor-school relationships. As Kirst (2002) has pointed out, mayors have a range of influence over the schools. Henig, et. al. (1999) and case studies in Cuban & Usdan (2003) also make clear the fact that mayors' influence is mitigated by other factors. This is consistent with interviews that we have conducted in some takeover districts, where it is apparent that although mayors may be given more control of the schools on paper, not all mayors take full advantage. While Mayors Menino in Boston and Mayor Daley in Chicago are seen as the exemplars, not all mayors have been such power brokers. In Cleveland, for instance, former Mayor Michael White allowed District Superintendent Barbara Byrd Bennett much autonomy. Further classification of the actual mayor-district relationship would enable researchers to

uncover more nuanced relationships between governance structure and outcomes. To make this data useful for multivariate, cross-district analysis, we would need to evaluate the mayor-schools relationship in all of the largest urban districts, not simply those where the most changes in governance structure have occurred.

As more data continues to become available, we believe that our framework for evaluation will produce more interesting results. Isolating the specific effects of mayoral takeover is a difficult task, but given that so many urban systems continue to turn to their mayors for help, researchers need to develop better tools to evaluate precisely what it is those mayors have added to mix.

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Table S-1. Percentage of revenue from federal, state, and local sources, 1992-2001

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover Cities *										
From Federal Sources	11.5	11.4	11.1	10.5	10.2	10.6	11.1	11.8	12.3	12.6
From State Sources	43.6	44.0	44.1	45.7	46.6	46.2	47.1	47.3	47.6	46.2
From Local Sources	44.9	44.6	44.8	43.9	43.2	43.2	41.8	40.9	40.0	41.2
100 Largest Urban Districts										
From Federal Sources	8.2	8.2	8.6	8.6	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.7	8.9	9.1
From State Sources	49.7	50.8	49.6	50.0	50.6	50.6	50.9	50.7	50.7	50.0
From Local Sources	42.1	41.0	41.8	41.4	40.9	41.0	40.6	40.6	40.4	40.9
100 Largest Non-Urban Districts										
From Federal Sources	4.7	5.3	5.4	5.2	5.1	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.6	5.7
From State Sources	48.4	48.8	47.3	46.6	47.4	48.4	48.9	49.1	49.1	48.9
From Local Sources	46.9	45.9	47.3	48.2	47.5	46.7	45.9	45.5	45.3	45.5

NOTES: * This is the average of 7 takeover cities (excluding NYC and Philadelphia). Note that in years previous to 2000, all of these cities had not undergone the transition to a mayoral appointed board.

TABLE S-3. Summary of Percent of Wages spent on General Administration, 1992-2001

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover Avg. *	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.5
Top 100	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8
Top 50	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7
Suburb	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Boston	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	1.5
Chicago	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.3
Cleveland	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.1
Baltimore	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	2.2	2.0
Detroit	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.6
Wash. DC	3.9	4.3	4.0	3.3	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.1	3.0	2.9
Oakland	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
Philly	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	2.9	2.9	3.0

NOTES: Data source is the Annual Survey of Government Finances. * This is the average of 7 takeover cities (excluding NYC and Philadelphia). Note that in years previous to 2000, all of these cities had not undergone the transition to a mayoral appointed board.

TABLE S-4. Summary of Level of Expenditures on Instruction (\$ per student), 1992-2001

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover Avg. *	3,522	3,802	3,763	4,068	4,229	4,382	4,454	4,818	5,087	5,767
Top 100	2,871	3,016	3,084	3,205	3,312	3,440	3,614	3,791	4,049	4,308
Top 50	2,827	2,969	3,032	3,151	3,271	3,383	3,583	3,750	4,008	4,268
Suburb	2,608	2,726	2,805	2,905	2,999	3,126	3,282	3,442	3,644	3,890
Boston	4,470	5,099	4,658	5,075	5,817	6,199	6,552	7,075	7,458	8,378
Chicago	3,064	3,472	3,476	3,697	3,673	3,707	4,083	4,520	4,401	4,626
Cleveland	3,539	3,791	3,598	3,812	4,013	4,771	3,721	4,460	4,489	4,883
Baltimore	3,277	3,422	3,447	3,858	4,080	4,215	4,929	4,711	4,817	5,411
Detroit	2,976	3,402	3,665	4,651	4,524	4,309	4,491	4,730	5,418	5,902
Wash. DC	4,083	4,192	4,351	4,183	4,197	4,290	3,676	4,370	4,498	5,982
Oakland	3,242	3,235	3,143	3,203	3,298	3,181	3,729	3,858	4,531	5,184
Philly	3,581	4,122	3,217	3,273	3,403	3,501	3,447	3,510	3,538	3,917

NOTES: Data source is the Annual Survey of Government Finances. * This is the average of 7 takeover cities (excluding NYC and Philadelphia). Note that in years previous to 2000, all of these cities had not undergone the transition to a mayoral appointed board.

TABLE S-5. Summary of Level of Expenditures on Wages for Teachers (\$ per student), 1992-2001

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover Avg. *	2,521	2,573	2,625	2,801	2,860	3,039	3,055	3,291	3,606	3,927
Top 100	2,170	2,238	2,293	2,403	2,460	2,541	2,660	2,798	2,974	3,124
Top 50	2,152	2,194	2,248	2,351	2,429	2,500	2,640	2,774	2,950	3,092
Suburb	1,986	2,016	2,075	2,154	2,206	2,295	2,402	2,527	2,682	2,858
Boston	2,890	2,606	2,984	3,460	3,508	3,849	4,019	4,332	5,016	5,401
Chicago	2,440	2,661	2,549	2,642	2,779	2,762	3,020	3,101	3,210	3,295
Cleveland	2,609	2,794	2,669	2,922	2,996	3,973	2,885	3,253	3,448	3,728
Baltimore	2,263	2,331	2,292	2,473	2,605	2,721	2,880	3,129	3,207	3,680
Detroit	2,338	2,414	2,507	2,844	3,011	2,985	3,034	3,274	3,759	4,001
Wash. DC	3,031	3,038	3,117	2,978	2,905	2,817	3,089	3,345	3,656	4,128
Oakland	2,073	2,167	2,255	2,286	2,215	2,162	2,461	2,602	2,947	3,254
Philly	2,231	2,314	2,174	2,278	2,322	2,430	2,377	2,398	2,451	2,703

NOTES: Data source is the Annual Survey of Government Finances. * This is the average of 7 takeover cities (excluding NYC and Philadelphia). Note that in years previous to 2000, all of these cities had not undergone the transition to a mayoral appointed board.

TABLE S-6. Percentage of All District Employees who are work in Student Support Services

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover Avg. *	2.0	1.6	1.8	4.1	2.1	2.3	2.4	3.1	3.9	6.0
Top 100	1.9	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.5	2.8
Top 50	2.4	2.2	2.5	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.7	2.7	3.0
Suburb	1.3	2.2	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.6	3.1	2.9	3.1
Boston	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.2	1.6	3.8
Chicago	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.3
Cleveland	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.1	0.8	0.8
Baltimore	2.4	2.4	2.9	2.3	2.9	1.2		3.2	3.2	3.7
Detroit	3.6	1.0	0.7	18.9	4.3	4.7	4.7	6.8	11.6	10.6
Wash. DC		0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6		2.0		3.4	16.3
Oakland	1.8	2.3	3.8	2.1	1.0	1.7	1.4	2.2	2.4	2.5
Philly	5.6	5.4	5.2	6.3	5.9	6.8	8.2	7.0	7.9	10.6

NOTES: Data source is the U.S. DOE Common Core of Data, Various Years. * This is the average of 7 takeover cities (excluding NYC and Philadelphia). Note that in years previous to 2000, all of these cities had not undergone the transition to a mayoral appointed board.

TABLE R-1. Relationship between Takeover and Other Measures of Urban School Governance in the 50 Largest Urban Districts, OLS Regression Results reported, controlling for District Size and Poverty Level

	Board Tenure	Mayor Tenure	Superintendent Tenure	Elected At-Large	Super Title is CEO	Number of Board Members
Takeover	-1.72 *	-0.71	0.28	-0.28	0.11	0.35
std. err.	(0.95)	(2.18)	(1.46)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.78)
Enroll	5.74E-07	1.42E-05	-1.5E-06	-7.4E-07	9.62E-08	-1.8E-06
std. err.	(2.75E-06)	(1.19E-05)	(3.7E-06)	(5.41E-07)	(7.25E-07)	(2.44E-06)
Poverty	0.05 *	0.04	-0.02	0	0	0
std. err.	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	2.76	2.45	5.67 ***	0.53 **	0.19	7.83 ***
std. err.	(1.4)	(2.25)	(1.41)	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.93)
N	35	47	40	48	38	48
Adj. R-2	0.0682	0.0062	-0.0423	0.0874	-0.0654	-0.0505

NOTES: Significant coefficients are in bold face and denoted as follows: *** for $p \leq .01$; ** for $p \leq .05$; * for $p \leq .1$.

TABLE R-2. Relationship between takeover and percentage of revenues from federal sources, OLS regression coefficients and (standard errors) reported

	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover	0.01 (0.011)	0.016 (0.01)	0.022 ** (0.011)	0.020 * (0.011)
Poverty	0.074 *** (0.017)	0.070 *** (0.016)	0.070 *** (0.017)	0.071 *** (0.017)
Enrollment	1.42E-09 (2.13E-08)	7.37E-09 (2.04E-08)	6.21E-09 (2.11E-08)	-7.69E-09 (2.11E-08)
Constant	0.047 *** (0.009)	0.050 *** (0.009)	0.052 *** (0.009)	0.054 *** (0.009)
N	93	93	93	93
Adj. R-2	0.2144	0.2298	0.2209	0.2013

NOTES: Significant coefficients are in bold face and denoted as follows: *** for $p \leq .01$; ** for $p \leq .05$; * for $p \leq .1$.

TABLE R-3. Relationship between Mayoral Takeover and Percent of Wages Spent on General Administration, OLS regression coefficients and (standard errors) reported

	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 * (0.003)
Enrollment	-1.20E-08 (1.04E-08)	-5.21E-09 (8.84E-09)	-9.13E-09 (9.86E-09)	-1.25E-08 (8.07E-09)
Poverty	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.009 * (0.005)	0.012 *** (0.004)
Constant	0.010 *** (0.003)	0.005 *** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
N	92	92	92	92
Adj. R-2	0.1149	0.0214	-0.0037	-0.009

NOTES: Significant coefficients are in bold face and denoted as follows: *** for $p \leq .01$; ** for $p \leq .05$; * for $p \leq .1$.

TABLE R-4. Relationship between Mayoral Takeover and Per-Student Level of Spending on Instructional Expenditures, OLS regression coefficients and (standard errors) reported

	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover	0.845 * (0.468)	1.130 ** (0.497)	1.196 ** (0.52)	1.531 *** (0.578)
Enrollment	-1.23E-06 (1.39E-06)	-1.47E-06 (1.45E-06)	-1.70E-06 (1.50E-06)	-1.92E-06 (1.64E-06)
Poverty	2.235 *** (0.669)	2.550 *** (0.711)	2.629 *** (0.745)	3.567 *** (0.828)
Constant	2.636 *** (0.357)	2.670 *** (0.379)	2.912 *** (0.398)	2.718 *** (0.442)
N	92	92	92	92
Adj. R-2	0.2466	0.178	0.181	0.1431

NOTES: Significant coefficients are in bold face and denoted as follows: *** for $p \leq .01$; ** for $p \leq .05$; * for $p \leq .1$.

TABLE R-5. Relationship between Mayoral Takeover and Per-Student Level of Spending on Teachers' Wages, OLS regression coefficients and (standard errors) reported

	1998	1999	2000	2001
Takeover	0.478 (0.33)	0.556 (0.338)	0.792 ** (0.359)	0.886 ** (0.37)
Enrollment	-8.19E-07 (9.79E-07)	-9.09E-07 (9.88E-07)	-1.15E-06 (1.03E-06)	-1.12E-06 (1.05E-06)
Poverty	1.487 *** (0.471)	1.752 *** (0.484)	1.746 *** (0.514)	2.134 *** (0.53)
Constant	2.017 *** (0.251)	2.023 *** (0.258)	2.224 *** (0.274)	2.179 *** (0.283)
N	92	92	92	92
Adj. R-2	0.2161	0.1651	0.1546	0.1162

NOTES: Significant coefficients are in bold face and denoted as follows: *** for $p \leq .01$; ** for $p \leq .05$; * for $p \leq .1$.

TABLE R-6. Relationship between Mayoral Takeover and *Percent of Staff Allocated to Student Services*, OLS regression coefficients and (standard errors) reported

	1998	1999	2000	2001
Base Model				
Takeover	0.006	0.008	0.018 *	0.044 ***
std. err.	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Enroll	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
std. err.	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Poverty	-0.00001	-0.00011	0.00006	-0.00026
std. err.	(0.00015)	(0.00024)	(0.00023)	(0.00022)
Constant	0.022 ***	0.032 **	0.022 *	0.041 ***
std. err.	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
N	92	92	92	92
Adj. R-2	-0.0635	-0.0522	0.0326	0.1993

NOTES: Significant coefficients are in bold face and denoted as follows: *** for $p \leq .01$; ** for $p \leq .05$; * for $p \leq .1$.

Table A-0. Assessment tools used in seven school districts with mayoral appointed school boards	
<i>District</i>	<i>Assessments Used</i>
Chicago	Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS); Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP)
Boston	Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)
Detroit	Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP)
Cleveland	Ohio Proficiency Test
Baltimore	Maryland School Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP)
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA) ^a
New York City	NYC Citywide English Language Arts (ELA) test; New York State English Language Arts (ELA) Test; NYC Math Test (NYC-M); New York State Math Test
NOTES: All achievement data analyzed in the following set of tables was obtained at either the relevant State Department of Education or school district web sites. ^a Also introduced the Philadelphia Citywide Proficiency Exam in 2000-2001.	

Table A-1. Reading achievement levels in Large Urban School Districts with Mayoral Appointed Boards, 1998-2002

Grade	Test	Subject	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
CHICAGO (% At or above national norms)							
K-8	ITBS	Read	37	39	40	40	43
9-10	TAP	Read	29	32	35	32	34
BOSTON (% Proficient or above)							
4	MCAS	Read	5	7	7	29	29
8 ^a	MCAS	Read	37	43	45	52	N/A
10	MCAS	Read	23	22	26	36	41
DETROIT (% Satisfactory)							
4	MEAP	Read	65	59	62	51	33.2
7	MEAP	Read	32	35	33	30	21.7
CLEVELAND (% Proficient or above)							
4	OH Prof.	Read	23	37	34	33	40
6	OH Prof.	Read	17	18	18	22	21
10	OH Prof.	Read	76	82	81	86	85
BALTIMORE (% Satisfactory)							
3	MSPAP	Read	17	16	19	17	12
8	MSPAP	Read	7	7	9	10	11
PHILADELPHIA (% Proficient or above)^b							
5	PSSA	Read	-	-	-	19	22
8	PSSA	Read	-	-	-	23	27
11	PSSA	Read	-	-	-	34	25
NEW YORK CITY (% Meeting or exceeding standards)							
4	State ELA	Read	-	32.7	41.7	43.9	46.5
8	State ELA	Read	-	35.2	32.5	33	29.5
3,4,5,6,8	NYC ELA	Read	-	36.7	40.5	39.8	39.3

NOTES: ^a. In 2002, 7th graders instead of 8th graders were tested on the MCAS. The 2002 data for 8th grade achievement is not available. ^b. Although the PSSA has been administered since 1996, results prior to 2001 are reported on the state department of education web site only as scale scores, which are not immediately interpretable as "% proficient or above."

Table A-2. Mathematics achievement levels in Large Urban Districts with Mayoral Appointed School Boards, 1998-2002

Grade	Test	Subject	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
CHICAGO (% At or above national norms)							
K-8	ITBS	Math	39	43	45	43	47
BOSTON (% Proficient or above)							
4	MCAS	Math	11	17	18	17	18
8	MCAS	Math	17	19	20	25	N/A
10	MCAS	Math	14	17	25	32	30
DETROIT (% Satisfactory)							
4	MEAP	Math	53	45	52	40	-
CLEVELAND (% Proficient or above)							
4	OH Prof.	Math	22	36	34	38	44
6	OH Prof.	Math	12	14	16	24	24
10	OH Prof.	Math	41	45	45	52	50
BALTIMORE (% Satisfactory)							
3	MSPAP	Math	13	11	14	20	13
8	MSPAP	Math	13	13	15	14	14
PHILADELPHIA (% Proficient or above) ^a							
5	PSSA	Math	-	-	-	18	20
8	PSSA	Math	-	-	-	16	21
11	PSSA	Math	-	-	-	24	20
NEW YORK CITY (% Meeting or exceeding standards)							
3,5,6,7	NYC-M	Math	-	32	33	32	35

NOTES: ^a Although the PSSA has been administered since 1996, results prior to 2001 are reported on the state department of education web site only as scale scores, which are not immediately interpretable as “% proficient or above.” Further, In 2002, 7th graders instead of 8th graders were tested on the MCAS in Boston.

Table A-3. Boston City Public Schools' Change in Achievement on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) from 1998 to 1999 & 2000 to 2002, Grades 4, 8, 10

		ENGLISH			
		<i>Change from 1998 to 1999</i>		<i>Change from 2000 to 2002</i>	
		%Proficient or above	%Failing	%Proficient or above	%Failing
4 th	<i>All schools</i>	+ 2	- 8	+ 18	- 8
Grade	Bottom 20% Schools	+ 4	- 16	+ 18	- 20
8 th	<i>All schools</i>	+ 3	- 5	+ 6	- 6
Grade ^a	Bottom 20% Schools	+ 5	- 11	+ 18	- 11
10 th	<i>All schools</i>	- 1	- 2	+ 8	- 20
Grade	Bottom 20% Schools	- 2	- 2	+ 11	- 35
		MATHEMATICS			
		<i>Change from 1998 to 1999</i>		<i>Change from 2000 to 2002</i>	
		%Proficient or above	%Failing	%Proficient or above	%Failing
4 th	<i>All schools</i>	+ 6	- 10	+ 1	- 1
Grade	Bottom 20% Schools	+ 9	- 14	+ 4	- 10
8 th	<i>All schools</i>	+ 2	- 10	+ 4	- 13
Grade ^a	Bottom 20% Schools	0	- 10	+ 3	- 20
10 th	<i>All schools</i>	+ 2	- 3	+ 2	- 14
Grade	Bottom 20% Schools	+ 1	- 4	+ 6	- 24

NOTES: MCAS classifies students in one of five categories: Advanced Level, Proficient, Needs Improvement, Failing (tested) and Failing (absent). Here, "%Proficient or Above" includes those students who are either advanced or proficient, and "% Failing" includes both those who failed due to testing and those who failed due to absence. These figures are for "Regular Students," which includes those students who are not identified as "Disabled" or "Limited English Proficiency." Bottom 20% Schools are those schools who performed in the lowest 20% in the base year. Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education. ^a In 2002, 7th graders instead of 8th graders were tested on the MCAS. The number in this table thus reflects the change from 2000 to 2001 (instead of 2002).

Table A-4. Chicago Public Schools' Change in Achievement on Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS, Gr. 3-8) and Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP, Gr. 9 & 11), 1994 to 1997; 1997 to 1999; and 2000 to 2002

	<i>Change from 1994 to 1997</i>		<i>Change from 1997 to 1999</i>		<i>Change from 2000 to 2002</i>	
	in percent of students at or above national norms		in percent of students at or above national norms		in percent of students at or above national norms	
	Reading	Math	Reading	Math	Reading	Math
<i>District Total</i>						
All	+ 4	+ 8	+ 7	+ 9	+ 3	+ 2
Grades						
Bottom 20%	+ 7	+ 13	+ 9	+ 16	+ 4	+ 3
<i>Grade 4</i>						
All schools	+ 3	+ 8	+ 11	+ 13	- 2	+ 2
Bottom 20%	+ 8	+ 12	+ 16	+ 19	+ 1	+ 5
<i>Grade 8</i>						
All schools	+ 3	+ 14	+ 8	+ 10	+ 10	+ 9
Bottom 20%	+ 10	+ 15	+ 14	+ 16	+ 18	+ 17
<i>Grades 9 & 11</i>						
All schools	+ 4	+ 9	+ 5	+ 7	- 1	-
Bottom 20%	+ 4	+ 9	+ 6	+ 9	0	-

NOTES: "Bottom 20%" schools were determined by taking the lowest performing schools at each grade level and in each subject area from the base year. For example, the sub-group, "Bottom 20% of fourth graders" in the first column represents the set of fourth graders at the schools that performed the poorest in 1994 (the base year for comparison to the 1996-97 school year.) Data Source: Chicago Public Schools web site: <http://cps.k12.il.us>.

TABLE A-5. Detroit Public Schools Change in % Satisfactory & % Low, as measured by the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP)

ENGLISH			
		<i>Change from 2000 to 2002</i>	
		<i>% Satisfactory</i>	<i>% Low</i>
4 th Grade	All Schools	- 18.5	+ 12.6
	Bottom 20% Schools	+ 1.2	+ 0.2
7 th Grade	All Schools	- 11.5	+ 13.0
	Bottom 20% Schools	-0.1	+3.7
MATH			
		<i>Change from 2000 to 2002</i>	
		<i>% Satisfactory</i>	<i>% Satisfactory</i>
4 th Grade	All Schools	- 11.8	+ 6.8
	Bottom 20% Schools	+ 9.6	- 6.8

TABLE A-6. Cleveland Public Schools Change in % Proficient or Above, as measured by the Ohio Proficiency Test

ENGLISH		
		<i>Change from 2000 to 2002</i>
		<i>% Proficient or Above</i>
4 th Grade	All Schools	+6
	Bottom 20% Schools	+11.4
6 th Grade	All Schools	+ 3
	Bottom 20% Schools	+2.5
10 th Grade	All Schools	+4
	Bottom 20% Schools	+ 14.3
MATH		
4 th Grade	All Schools	+10
	Bottom 20% Schools	+21.9
6 th Grade	All Schools	+8
	Bottom 20% Schools	+6.6
10 th Grade	All Schools	+5
	Bottom 20% Schools	+25.7

TABLE A-7. Variance in level of school achievement in BOSTON, Measured with Coefficient of Variation

BOSTON	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<i>Reading</i>					
Grade 4					
Reading	1.433	0.979	1.031	0.591	0.589
Grade 8					
Reading	0.764	0.707	0.638	0.516	-
Grade 10					
Reading	1.415	1.422	1.261	0.946	0.835
<i>Math</i>					
Grade 4 Math	1.013	0.805	0.740	0.891	0.816
Grade 8 Math	1.499	1.493	1.466	1.332	1.236
Grade 10					
Math	1.787	1.669	1.377	1.148	1.225

TABLE A-8. Variance in level of school achievement in CHICAGO, Measured with Coefficient of Variation

CHICAGO	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
<i>Reading</i>							
Grade 3	0.561	0.562	0.526	0.542	0.515	0.489	0.572
Grade 4	0.562	0.444	0.432	0.385	0.460	0.429	0.449
Grade 5	0.502	0.481	0.383	0.485	0.412	0.480	0.467
Grade 6	0.598	0.538	0.580	0.539	0.464	0.504	0.528
Grade 7	0.569	0.565	0.458	0.441	0.516	0.417	0.415
Grade 8	0.625	0.569	0.520	0.480	0.455	0.378	0.403
<i>Math</i>							
Grade 3	0.570	0.481	0.499	0.445	0.476	0.475	0.458
Grade 4	0.551	0.459	0.418	0.412	0.511	0.447	0.411
Grade 5	0.548	0.514	0.401	0.442	0.448	0.458	0.451
Grade 6	0.575	0.558	0.524	0.421	0.475	0.489	0.541
Grade 7	0.577	0.516	0.449	0.438	0.436	0.406	0.330
Grade 8	0.505	0.523	0.413	0.445	0.437	0.357	0.368

TABLE A-9. Variation in level of school achievement in DETROIT, Measured with Coefficient of Variation

DETROIT	2000	2001	2002
Grade 4 Reading	0.326	0.364	0.379
Grade 7 Reading	0.445	0.356	0.442
Grade 4 Math	0.270	0.312	-

NOTES: Table presents the coefficient of variation, weighted for school enrollment.

TABLE A-10. Variance in level of school achievement in CLEVELAND, Measured with Coefficient of Variation

CLEVELAND	2000	2001	2002
<i>Reading</i>			
Grade 4 Reading	0.485	0.417	0.477
Grade 6 Reading	0.821	0.664	0.760
Grade 9 Reading	0.144	0.115	0.087
Grade 10 Reading	0.083	0.056	0.042
<i>Math</i>			
Grade 4 Math	0.560	0.512	0.446
Grade 6 Math	1.013	0.699	0.801
Grade 9 Math	0.363	0.314	0.369
Grade 10 Math	0.235	0.149	0.171

NOTES: Table presents the coefficient of variation, weighted for school enrollment.

Table L-1. Candidate Participation Levels in LSC Elections, 1989-2002

NUMBER OF CANDIDATES				
	Parents	Community	Teachers	All
2002	4,200	1,675	1,480	7,355
2000	4,051	1,614	1,430	7,095
1998	4,073	1,540	1,480	7,093
1996	4,493	1,682	1,620	7,795
1993	4,254	1,495	1,612	7,361
1991	4,739	1,858	1,545	8,142
1989	9,329	4,818	2,492	16,639

RATIO OF CANDIDATES TO AVAILABLE SEATS				
	Parents	Community	Teachers	All
2002	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.3
2000	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.3
1998	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4
1996	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4
1993	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.3
1991	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.5
1989	2.9	4.4	2.2	3.1

Table L-2. Turnout for Chicago Local School Council Elections, 1989-1998

	1989	1991	1993	1996	1998
Parents	113,008	44,735	33,701	68,210	52,611
Staff	92,276	35,583	23,544	24,519	25,739
Community	34,902	30,514	27,435	29,313	15,948
Students	245,186	108,832	84,680	122,042	39,413

NOTES: Data source is "Local School Council Elections," *Catalyst*, 7 (8), May 1996. "Comings and Goings," *Catalyst*. Vol. IX, No. 8, May 1998

Table L-3. Explaining participation levels in 2000 in Chicago's Local School Councils, Bi-variate correlations

	Parent Participation	Community Participation	Teacher Participation
% Black (sig.)	-0.088 (0.041)	0.139 (0.001)	-0.014 (0.745)
% Low Income (sig.)	-0.185 (0)	0.039 (0.372)	0.137 (0.001)
Student Mobility (sig.)	-0.139 (0.001)	0.082 (0.058)	0.088 (0.042)